karya Yayak Yatmaka
Seri Kompilasi Kajian Ilmiah Genosida 1965-1966
Asvi Warman Adam, Baskara T. Wardaya, Ariel Heryanto, Robert Cribb, Annie Pohlman, John Roosa, Saksia Wieringa, Katharine McGregor, Peter Dale Scott, Benedict Anderson, Vannessa Hearman, Jess Melvin, Noam Chomsky, Bradley Simpson, Geoffrey Robinson, Greg Poulgrain, Alex de Jong, Andre Vltchek, Taomo Zhou , Soe Tjen Marching, Peter Kasenda, Aiko Kurasawa, Akihisa Matsuno , Nathaniel Mehr, Adam Hughes Henry
*masih terus ditambahkan
Chomsky turut bersuara atas tragedi pembantaian tahun 1965-1966 yang menyeret nyawa ratusan ribu anggota Partai Komunis Indonesia dan para tertuduh lainnya. Di tulisannya untuk Jurnal Indonesia volume 66 (Oktober 1998), Chomsky menyebut peristiwa yang
menjadi bibit penggulingan Presiden Sukarno itu sebanding dengan kekejaman Joseph Stalin di Rusia, Adolf Hitler di Jerman, atau Mao Zedong di RRC. Dalang di balik ini semua tak lain adalah rezim Soeharto, yang disebut Chomsky berkuasa dengan bantuan Badan Intelijen Pusat AS (CIA).
Soeharto telah jadi favorit pemerintah dan investor Barat sejak 1965. Untuk mempertahankan kekuasaannya, Gedung Putih telah berulang kali melanggar keputusan Kongres agar tetap bisa memberi bantuan dan pelatihan militer kepada militer Indonesia. Chomsky
mencatat bantuan ini datang dari peraturan presiden AS Jimmy Carter pada 1978 maupun Bill Clinton pada 1993 dan 1998. Indonesia yang ramah investasi, kata Chomsky, jadi hadiah terbaik bagi Barat yang haus akan bahan mentah dan hasil tambang yang melimpah di Indonesia—termasuk Papua.
Indonesia, Master Card in
Washington’s Hand – Noam Chomsky
“The problem of Indonesia” persisted. In 1958 US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, informed the National Security Council that Indonesia was one of three major world crises, along with Algeria and the Middle East. He emphasized that there was no Soviet role in any of these cases, with the “vociferous” agreement of President Eisenhower. The main problem in Indonesia was the Communist party (PKI), which was winning “widespread support not as a revolutionary party
but as an organization defending the interests of the poor within the existing system,” developing a “mass base among the peasantry” through its “vigor in defending the interests of the . . . poor.”3 The US
embassy in Jakarta reported that it might not be possible to overcome the PKI “by ordinary democratic means,” so that “elimination” by
police and military might be undertaken. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that “action must be taken, including overt measures as required, to ensure either the success of the dissidents or the suppression of the pro-communist elements of the Sukarno government.”
The “dissidents” were the leaders of a rebellion in the outer islands, the site of most of Indonesia’s oil and US investments. US support for the secessionist movement was “by far the largest, and to this day the least known, of the Eisenhower administration’s covert militarized interventions,” two leading Southeast Asia specialists conclude in a revealing study.4 When the rebellion collapsed, after bringing down the last residue of parliamentary institutions, the US turned to
other means to “eliminate” the country’s major political force. This
goal was achieved when Suharto took power in 1965, with Washington’s strong support and assistance. Army-led massacres wiped out the PKI and devastated its mass base in “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century,” comparable to the atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, the CIA reported, judging “the Indonesian coup” to be “certainly one of the most significant events of the twentieth century.”5 Perhaps half a million or more were killed within a few months.
Karya Agustin Sibarani yang menjadi ilustrasi artikel Noam Chomsky Indonesia, Master Card in Washington’s Hand di Jornal Indonesia vol 66 terbitan Cornell University’s Southeast Asia Program.
Catatan Pendek Nathaniel Mehr tentang Noam Chomksy dan bukunya Constructive
Bloodbath’ in Indonesia: The United States, Britain and the Indonesian Killings
Violence Bloodbaths in Fact & Propaganda
by Noam Chomsky &
Edward S. Herman
Disalin dari Bab 1 sub
bab 3 Benign and Constructive Bloodbaths: East Pakistan, Burundi, and Indonesia
ebook lengkapnya bisa disimak di
The huge massacre in Indonesia 1965-69 provides the most impressive demonstration of the U.S establishment’s response to a major bloodbath where the political results of the slaughter are regarded as “positive.” During the Indonesian counterrevolutionary bloodbath of 1965-66, at a minimum several hundred thousand men, women and children were butchered summarily in cold blood, with the estimated numbers of victims running up to a million.  The army played
a key role in this holocaust, doing a large part of the killing directly,
supplying trucks, weapons and encouragement to para-military and vigilante death squads, and actively stimulating an anti-Communist hysteria that contributed greatly to wholesale mass murder. This slaughter was described by the anti-Communist Indonesia expert Justus M. van der Kroef as “afrightful anti-Communist pogrom where, “it is to be feared, innocent victims of mere hearsay were killed” (as opposed, presumably, to the guilty Communist men, women and children who fully deserved their fate).  In 1968 there was a renewal of mass executions, and in one single case in early 1969 army and local civic guards in Central Java “were said to have killed some 3500 alleged followers of the PKI by means of blows of iron staves in the neck.” 
During this period of massacres, the number of political prisoners, almost invariably untried and often maltreated, ran from a minimum estimate of 70,000 to well over 100,000. Similar numbers remain imprisoned today, untried and with little prospect of trial.  The rule of law was (and still is) suspended for the purposes of this continuing bloodbath and mass incarceration, according to van der Kroef,
it was a period of “endless and often arbitrary arrests, brutalization of
prisoners, and an atmosphere of distrust in which exhibitions of violent
anti-communism are believed to be the best way to convince suspicious local military of one’s bona tides.” 
Meanwhile, this land of mass murder and huge concentration camps has become “a paradise for investors.”  Following the “showcase contract” with Freeport Sulphur (which included, among other things, a lengthy tax holiday), things tightened up a little, but applications for licenses to exploit Indonesia’s mineral resources increased rapidly. Speaking at a news conference held in the Wall Street offices of International Nickel Company in July, 1970, a high official of the Indonesian government pointed out that foreign capital was showing great confidence in his country’s ability to resist nationalization pressures.  This investor appeal has not been noticeably affected by (and has gone hand in hand with) the “rampant corruption in the bureaucracy and the armed forces… . Some foreign investors bidding for concessions find that they have to pay huge bribes.” 
All things considered, then, the developments of the past seven years in Indonesia have been favorable to the predominant interests of the Free World. Appropriately, therefore, the American response to the holocaust proper was restrained. No Congressman denounced it on the floor of Congress, and no major American relief organization offered aid.  Media treatment of the events was sparse with the
victims usually described merely as “Communists and sympathizers.”
Little mention was made of the large numbers of women and children massacred or the modes and details of the slaughter. For the leaders of the United Statesthis bloodbath was a plus. In a Freedom House advertisement in November, 1966,signed by “145 distinguished Americans” including Jacob Javits, Dean Acheson, Thomas D. Cabot, Harry Gideonse, Lewis E. Powell, Whitelaw Reid, Lincoln Bloomfield and Samuel Huntington, the events in Indonesia were treated
as follows.’ “It [the Vietnam intervention by the United States] provided
a shield for the sharp reversal of Indonesia’s shift toward Communism, whichhas removed the threats to Singapore and Malaysia.”  And in the statement on Asian policy sponsored by Freedom House and signed initially by 14 leading “moderate” political scientists and historians, the series of events that included the huge Indonesian bloodbath were described merely as “dramatic changes” implicitly constructive in character, although these scholars, as noted earlier, condemn “violence” as a mode of achieving social change.  This humanistic treatment was paralleled by that of the late Prime Minister of Australia, Harold Holt, who told the River Club of New York City in July 1966 that “with 500,000 to 1 million Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think’ it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place.” 
Late in 1972 General Maxwell Taylor explained to U.S. News and World Report that “Indonesia’s independence today and its relative freedom from an internal Communist threat is attributable, to a large degree, to what we’ve accomplished in South Vietnam.” With large U.S. forces moving into Vietnam the Indonesian anti-Communists “were willing to run the risk of eliminating President Sukarno and destroying the Indonesian Communists.”  That’s all. It apparently does not even occur to this “military adviser to four Presidents” that there might be any moral issue in “destroying the Indonesian Communists.” This was a constructive bloodbath. The victims, once identified as Communists, have lost all claim to humanity and merit whatever treatment they received. Since the result is the preservation of a neo-colonial economic and social structure and an “open door” to American investment, only sentimentalists will moralize over the bloodbath. America’s
academic, business and political leaders must turn their attention to more serious matters.
Indonesia: “The Act Of Killing” and Noam Chomsky
Noam Chomsky :
In the early years after the war, there was a conflict of policy initiatives. The U.S. was opposed to the old imperial systems in the region because they blocked U.S. economic and other interventions, but they were also opposed to nationalist movements developing. So conflicting policies were taking shape in different places.
In Indonesia, for example, after the 1948 Madiun massacre, the U.S. decided to support Sukarno [the first president of Indonesia, 1945–67]. But in Indochina, by the late 1940s the U.S. was vacillating, and it shifted towards supporting the French re-conquest. But what they were really concerned about was not Indochina, if you read the documents, but Indonesia.
Indonesia had rich resources, it was a big important country, while Indochina did not amount to much. But they were afraid that, as planners put it, “the rot would spread” from Vietnam to Thailand and even to Indonesia, and possibly even to Japan. The U.S. was concerned that Japan might “accommodate” to an independent Southeast
Asia, becoming its commercial and industrial center. That would in effect mean that the U.S. had lost its Pacific phase of World War II, which was fought to prevent Japan from developing what they called a New Order in Asia. Roughly like that. The U.S. in 1950 was not prepared to lose World War II, so that’s when they began a massive support of the French in Indochina. And then in 1958 Eisenhower carried out the biggest intervention so far in the post-war period: to try to split off the outer islands of Indonesia, where most of the natural
resources are, to get them under U.S. control.
The U.S. were also concerned over too much democracy in Indonesia. If you read U.S. records from that period, you can see that they were concerned that Sukarno’s government was allowing political participation by the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia), which scholarship understands to have been basically the party of the poor.
They were afraid that if this continued, if there was a democratic process, the PKI would gain control. But the U.S. intervention failed. And we know what happened in 1965.
simak 400 ‘entry’ lainnya pada link berikut
Road to Justice : State Crimes after Oct 1st 1965 (Jakartanicus)
Definisi yang diusulkan D. Nersessian (2010) untuk amandemen/ optional protocol Konvensi Anti-Genosida (1948) dan Statuta Roma (2000) mengenai Pengadilan Kejahatan Internasional. (disalin dari Harry Wibowo)