

The Army and the Indonesian Genocide

Major Findings and New Directions

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KOMNAS PEREMPUAN





The question of military agency

- Is it possible to prove military agency behind the killings?
- Were the killings implemented as a centralized national campaign?
- The need for a new narrative

Denial of the genocide

- The military forced to step in to “save” the nation
- The killings depicted by the military as a “spontaneous” uprising by “the people”
- Known collectively as “G.30.S/PKI”
- “The West’s best news for years in Asia”, *TIME*, 6 July 1966



How has the genocide been explained?

- The military “encouraged” armed mobs “to take advantage of [the] anti-PKI climate...” | Lucien Rey, 1966
- “The Army clearly intended to destroy the party root and branch... the PKI was rapidly rounded up and destroyed” with the assistance of military-trained vigilante groups | Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson, 1971

“[Although] the simplest way of explaining the mass killings is to charge the Army with having used its near-monopoly of the means of violence to kill the communists... It would be difficult to prove that the massacre was planned by Soeharto and the officers supporting him, or even to argue that they stood in an way to gain from it.”

Killings carried out by “Muslims” and “villagers” whom the military were unable to “stop”.



In Aceh: “Acehnese is a frenzy of *jihad* set out to kill the communists in Aceh... [Aceh’s Military Commander] General Ishak Djuarsa attempted to limit the mass slaughter.” | Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 1982



'Annihilate
them down to
the roots!'
*Angkatan
Bersendjata*, 8
October 1965.



Alternative narratives/ major breakthroughs

- Major outstanding question: Were the killings spontaneous or part of coordinated campaign?
- Did the military produce and send formal written orders? (Crouch, 1978), Were systematic records kept of the killings? (Cribb, 2010)





2. Jalarkan tugas sebagaimana biasa
 3. Jaga disiplin pasukan sebaik2nja
 4. Mengikuti perintah/instruksi selanjutnja dari bang
 satu.

c. Berdasarkan instruksi tersebut telah di-instruksikan-
 kepada kesatuan bawahan dengan radiogram Pangdahaan".
 nomor Notakilat-5/Kes/65/10020100 dan instruksi nomor
 TOL-10/4-1/1001180/65.

2 : 3 OKT.'65 : Djam 07.30 wib di Idia Atjeh Timur telah terjdjadi demons-
 trasi tanpa idzin dan dapat digagalkan/dibubarkan, namun
 tindakan para demonstrasi sempat mengrusakkan beberapa -
 toko.

3 : 4 OKT.'65 : Djam 20.00 wib telah diadakan rapat dipendopo Gubernuran
 jang diadiri oleh Pantja Tunggal Ek-I dan Staf Kodalan
 "A" serta Pantja Tunggal Ek-II Atjeh Besar/Kotapradja -
 Banda Atjeh, untuk mendiskusikan dan menentukan sikap -
 serta melakukan penilaian keadaan jang berhubungan de-
 ngan gerakan 30 September.

4 : 5 OKT.'65 : Pada djam 27.00 wib dilanjutkan rapat Staf Kodalan "A"
 di aula Kodan-I dan mengeluarkan instruksi Pelrada no
 mor TOL-3/Silat/1005000, djuga kawat utjapan belasanjaka-
 wa dari Pangdahaan "A" kepada RUM PR MIDAN.

4 : 5 OKT.'65 : Djam 12.00 wib Kasdam-I memberikan briefing khusus kepa-
 da anggota Kodan-I, tentang kesjadian2 Gerakan 30 Sep-
 tember. Kasin2 djawatan melanjutkan kepada bawahannya
 untuk mentjajah timbulnja salah pengertian tentang situ-
 asi jang dihadapi, sedjak tanggal 5 Oktober 1965 diman-
 mana telah dilakukan sembahjang saib oleh kaum Muslimin.
 Perasaan2 anti PKI sudah sangat meluas dan dapat dibukti-
 kan dengan adanya pemplot2, spanjut2, tjoretan2 dan teri-
 akan2.

5 : 6 OKT.'65 : a. Djam 11.00 wib rapat Parpol bersama Front Nasional -
 Tingkat-I dan Pantja Tunggal Tingkat-I mengeluarkan -
 pernyataan s.l.
 1. Tuntutan 7 Parpol kepada Pelrada untuk membubar-
 kan PKI dan Ormasnja.
 2. Keputusan bersama terbentuknja Front Pantjasila.
 3. Mengutuk Gerakan 30 September
 4. Pernyataan Pantja Tunggal Atjeh.
 b. Djam 16.00 di Banda Atjeh telah terjdjadi demonstrasi-
 oleh Parpol PKI beserta Ormasnja, bergerak dari arah-
 Setu menuju ke Pendopo dan diterima oleh Pantja -

What is it now possible to know?

The Indonesian genocide files

1 October 1965

Key orders:

- Morning of 1 October: “A Coup movement has occurred” (Suharto)/ “Await further orders/ instructions from the Panglatu [Mokoginta]” (Mokoginta)
- 9pm 1 October: “We have the regions under our control”
- Midnight 1 October: “It is ordered... all members of the Armed Forces *resolutely and completely annihilate* this counter-revolution” (Mokoginta)
- New Defense Region Command (Kohanda) and ‘Operasi Berdikari’ is activated



Initial coordination


- Initial military and government coordination meetings held throughout province
- Military's Annihilation campaign adopted by Civilian Government
- On 4 October: military orders civilians to "assist" the military "in every attempt to completely annihilate the Counter Revolutionary 30 September Movement"



- Djuarsa embarks on coordination tour throughout province
- At public meetings civilian population issued with ultimatum by Djuarsa, 'Kill the PKI or you will be targeted'







The spread of public violence

Demonstrations develop into pogrom actions from 7 October and spread throughout province

Violence portrayed as “spontaneous” but meticulously recorded by military

1,941 recorded by military as killed during this period

Military arrest campaign

12. Kuala Ulee Rubek Seunuddon
13. Kuala Pase Geudong
14. Kuala Udjong Blang Lhoseunawe
15. Teupin Mane Bireuen
16. Tjot Girek Lhosukon
17. Elang Pulo Tjunda
18. Geulanggang Labu Mtg. Glp. dua
19. Tjot Gapu Bireuen
20. Tambue Samalanga

PERSENDJATAAN :

Dalam rangka pembersihan/penumpasan G 30 S kepada Anggota Hansip/Hanra Sektor IV Atjeh Utara oleh Kosekhan Atjeh Utara untuk keperluan itu telah membagi-bagikan sendjata ke-
Daerah2 Sub Sektor Hansip/Hanra yang dianggap perlu adalah :

- a. Sub Sektor Seunuddon 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten,
- b. Sub Sektor Samalanga 16 putjuk L.E.
- c. Sub Sektor Djeumpa Bireuen 1 putjuk Garand + 1 Putjuk LE.
- d. Kantor Pemerintah Daerah di Lhoseunawe 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten,
- e. Kantor Vital (Bni Unit II, III) 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten.

WEAPONS DISTRIBUTED

Rifles and machine guns distributed
to civilian paramilitary groups

Sten Machine gun
- built made
used in
Vietnam
war

Direct military involvement in the violence

- Mass killings begin throughout province once detainee populations in military jails reach critical mass
- Detainees transported to military controlled killing sites on trucks
- Killed by military or other appointed executioners





Creation of military “War Room”

- 14 October: Djuarsa issued an Instruction “*establishing the creation of a RUANG YUDHA (War Room) for [all] military units*”
- The War Room “*enabled KODAM I to carryout NON-CONVENTIONAL war in accordance with the Concept of Territorial Warfare [and enabled it to] succeed in annihilating them [“GESTOK”] together with the people...*” (emphasis in original)

A
centralised
national
campaign?

Is this information
relevant only to Aceh?

How were the killings
coordinated
nationally?


Commander of the Armed Forces
(Pangad)
Suharto

Military Region Command
(Kodam)

Strategic Command
(Kostrad)
Suharto

Special Forces
(RPKAD)
Wibowo

Special Operations Command
(KOTI)
Suharto



Operation Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order
(KOPKAMTIB)
Suharto

6 Dec 1965

What is it now possible to know?

- There is clear evidence of military agency behind the killings
- The military described the killings as an “Annihilation Operation”
- The military ordered civilians to participate in this campaign
- The military established and armed death squads and civilian militia groups to help implement the killings
- The killings were initiated and implemented by the military as a centralized, national campaign

